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The paper studies symptoms of Dutch disease in the Pakistani economy arising from 
international remittances. An IV Bayesian analysis is carried out to take care of the 
endogeneity and uncertainty due to the managed float of Pakistani Rupee. We find evidence 
for both spending and resource movement effects in both the short and the long-run. These 
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contribute to the Dutch disease in Pakistan, those from North America and Europe do not. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Remittances are an important source of foreign exchange for developing countries. 
The volume of remittance transfers to many developing countries, including Pakistan, 
exceeds that of foreign private capital and official development assistance. Remittances 
to Pakistan have seen a sharp and sustained rise in the recent years, increasing from 
under $1 billion in 1999 to over $12 billion today (State Bank of Pakistan, 2012). This 
has not gone without leaving its macroeconomic impact. Anecdotal evidence points to 
links with higher price levels and added reliance on imports (State Bank of Pakistan, 
2007). 
Remittances are found to promote economic growth (Stark and Lucas, 1988; Faini, 
2002). Rise in remittances has also made the developing countries governments like 
Pakistan’s less reliant on other financial inflows for their foreign exchange requirements. 
Remittances are also purported to be a relatively stable source of foreign exchange 
 
* We are most grateful to an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions. 
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(Mughal and Makhlouf, 2011), more so than FDI and portfolio inflows, and help 
countries cope up with difficult economic conditions. 
Remittances to Pakistan are found to be sent primarily for altruistic motives (Anwar 
and Mughal, 2012), and therefore help the migrant households survive in times of crisis. 
Remittance inflows, for instance, rose substantially in the aftermath of the October 2005 
earthquake and the country’s worst floods in July 2010. These inflows have also led to 
lower poverty and economic disparity in the country (Mughal and Anwar, 2012). 
Remittances, however, can lead to the overshooting of a country’s exchange rate and 
hurt its competitiveness, a phenomenon known as the Dutch disease. The overvaluated 
exchange rate makes the country’s exports relatively expensive, imports cheaper, and 
thus puts pressure on the country’s current account. The additional demand arising from 
remitted money raises prices in the non-tradable sector while the prices can not move 
much in the tradable sector in a small open economy. This shifts resources from industry 
and agriculture (tradable sectors) to services (non-tradable sector), making the country’s 
tradable sector less competitive. Why does this matter? In the words of Rajan and 
Subramanian (2010): “a number of studies (Jones and Olken, 2005; and Rodrik, 2007) 
have argued that the traded goods sector is the channel through which an economy 
absorbs best practices from abroad. The absence of these learning-by-doing spillovers, 
which may be critical to long run productivity growth, could be one constraint on 
growth”. 
The aforementioned spending and resource shifting effects of the Dutch disease 
which lead to lower competitiveness have been examined for various developing 
countries. For example, in their study of 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries,  
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) find that a 100 percent rise of remittances cause the 
real exchange rate (REER) to appreciate by 22 percent. Similarly, Bourdet and Falck 
(2006), in their empirical analysis of the Cape Verdean economy, find evidence of 
adverse effects of remittances and official development assistance on the country’s 
competitiveness. Acosta et al. (2009) examine a panel of 109 developing countries for 
the period of 1990 to 2003 and find that capital flows from abroad help the exchange 
rate go up. Kapur (2004) argues that the exchange-rate appreciating effect of remittances 
is stronger among smaller developing countries. 
Remittances have also been associated with declining competitiveness through a 
decrease in the labour supply in the remittance-receiving country (Amuedo-Dorante and 
Pozo, 2006; Bussolo and Medvedev, 2007; Görlich et al., 2007).  
However, there is no consensus on the deleterious effects of remittances on external 
competitiveness. Rajan and Subramanian (2005), for instance, find remittances to be 
different from other financial flows in this sense. Mongardini and Rayner (2009) look 
for the impact of worker remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa, and find no link with rise in 
exchange rate. Grabel (2008) suggests that the short-term impacts of remittances are 
similar to those of other financial inflows, with the differences mostly due to different 
economic policies.  
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In the context of Pakistan, Hyder and Mahboob (2006) estimate that an increase in 
workers’ remittances of one percentage point of GDP is associated with an appreciation 
of Pakistan’s real effective exchange rate by 0.16 percent. Similarly Ahmed (2009) finds 
that a 1% increase in remittances as a share of GDP appreciates Pakistan’s real exchange 
rate by approximately 2.5%. Other studies on Pakistan include Afridi (1995), Chishti 
and Hasan (1993), Haque and Montiel (1992, 1998), Hussain (2008), Janjua (2007), and 
Rehman et al. (2010). These studies generally evaluate the country’s equilibrium 
exchange rate, and do not study the resource movement symptoms of Dutch disease.   
Remittances, being financial inflows, are intrinsically associated with the country’s 
monetary aggregates, and hence, influence and may in turn be influenced by the 
country’s monetary policy. Any model studying the impact of worker remittances on a 
developing economy will therefore contain an element of uncertainty present due to the 
role of the country’s central bank. Whether by performing sterilization operations in the 
open market or controlling money supply to combat inflation acceleration, the central 
bank appears in the remittances - real exchange rate equation in one way or the other. 
Given this uncertainty, and the availability of limited number of observations, significant 
number of parameters and potential endogeneity issue make the use of standard 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) techniques problematic for the problem at hand. The use 
of probabilistic Bayesian paradigm can help in such a situation. In this paper, we study 
the Dutch disease aspect of migrant remittances to Pakistan using Bayesian analytical 
methods.  
Though the use of probabilistic approach is increasing in economic studies, 
particularly those dealing with macro and financial economics,1 this is to the best of our 
knowledge, the first application of the technique in a study of Dutch disease effects.  
In this study, we employ both annual as well as monthly data, examining the periods 
1980-2008 and July 2000-March 2009 respectively. This helps us gauge both the short- 
and medium/long-run role of foreign remittances on the country’s external and internal 
competitiveness. Appropriate instrumental variable has been selected and constructed to 
tackle remittances’ potential endogeneity due to reverse causality between the volume of 
remittances and the country’s real exchange rate. We also look at the sector-wise effect 
of remittances to determine which sectors have lost competitiveness as a result of 
remittance flows. Consequently, we are able to monitor both the spending as well as the 
resource movement aspects of the Dutch disease. 
Moreover, in assessing the remittances’ impact on the REER, remittance flows are 
disaggregated with respect to remitting regions. This helps better examine the 
differential impact of remittance transfers pertaining to different Pakistani migrant 
communities. Previous studies on remittance flows to Pakistan such as Mughal and 
Makhlouf (2011) reported that migrant remittances from the three main remitting 
 
1 For other applications of Bayesian paradigm in macroeconomics, see for example Clark and Doh 
(2011)’s evaluation of trend inflation and Antonakakis and Tondl (2011)’s study on the determinants of FDI. 
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regions differ substantially in their macroeconomic behaviour. The volatility and 
magnitude of remittances from these regions varies substantially, and can therefore 
impact the country’s course of currency and sectorial transformation in a differential 
manner. A region-wise analysis of remittances’ impact on competitiveness can thereby 
help us better comprehend their role in the economy.  
We are mainly interested in answering the following questions: 
Has Pakistan’s real exchange rate gone up as a result of remittance inflows? 
If so, remittance flows from which regions have contributed the most? 
Has the country’s competitiveness suffered as a result? How, if so, have the inflows 
altered the country’s economic structure? 
In the rest of the paper, we attempt at analyzing these questions. First, we present 
some salient features of the Pakistani economy during the period under examination 
(Section 2). Section 3 introduces the model and describes the econometric technique 
used. The results are presented and interpreted in Section 4, both for the yearly and 
short-run monthly models. Section 5 analyzes the impact of remittances on the 
reallocation of resources between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The last section 
concludes the paper and provides some policy recommendations. 
 
 
2.  REMITTANCES AND EXCHANGE RATE OF PAKISTAN: 
SOME STYLIZED FACTS 
 
Pakistan is one of the significant migrant sending countries in Asia. An estimate of 
the number of overseas Pakistanis ranges from the official 4 million (United Nations, 
2009) to the estimated 7 million (Economic Survey, 2009-10). Major concentrations of 
the diaspora are found in Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States, the 
United Arab Emirates and Canada. Pakistanis resident in these five countries constitute 
more than 80 percent of the overseas Pakistani population Oda (2009). Historically, 
remittances sent by the overseas Pakistanis have ranged from 1 to 10 per cent of the 
country’s annual output, average during the last thirty years being 5%. This compares 
favourably with other foreign capital inflows (Figure 1).  
The Persian Gulf, North America and Europe are country’s principal remittance 
source regions (Figure 2). Remittances to Pakistan first picked up in the 1970’s, when the 
construction boom in the Persian Gulf engaged millions of Pakistani temporary migrants. 
The amount remitted by these migrants peaked in early 1980’s, when the flows surpassed 
exports as the biggest source of foreign capital. The inflows slowed down during the 
cheap oil period of late 1980’s and the 1990’s with the weakening of Arab economies. The 
Gulf war in the early 1990’s also had a dampening effect on remittances. The second and 
ongoing phase of growth in official remittances began in the aftermath of the tragic events 
of September 11, when in the financial year 2001-02, formal remittances to Pakistan more 
than doubled. Besides the curbs on illegal money transfer mechanisms, called Hundi or 
Hawala, fears among the migrants in the Western countries, such as stricter scrutiny of 
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their capital investments, risk to life or property convinced them to transfer their savings 
back home. Strengthening currencies, booming real estate sector and well performing 
stock markets in the home country also played their role. Free float of Pakistani Rupee, 
that slashed the official - market exchange rate spread, also channelled more remittances 
towards the formal means of money transfer. Though the rise in receipts from all the 
destinations has been substantial, remittances from United States have risen the most, 
from a mere $73.3 million in 2000 to over $1.7 billion in 2008. 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank World Development Indicators (2011).  
 
Figure 1.  Remittances, Foreign Direct Investments and Official Development 
Assistance to Pakistan (1973-2010) 
 
 
This boom has taken the share of remittances in the Pakistani economy to the highest 
levels since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Remittances have now become the second 
most important source of foreign exchange after cotton and textile exports (which make 
up half of the country’s exports). Being such a substantial source of foreign exchange, 
remittances must generate some effect on Pakistan’s exchange rate. This raises the 
possibility of the economy facing the Dutch disease. A cursory look at Figure 3 shows a 
correlation between the remittance flows and the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
of the Pakistani Rupee. Pakistan’s REER index gradually fell during the 1980s and 90s. 
In 1982, Pakistan abandoned fixed exchange rate and switched to a managed float 
regime. The Rupee fell sharply in the following decades, owing mainly to chronic trade 
deficit. This was despite the sharp rise in official migrant remittances which reached an 
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all time high of ten percent of the GDP in the financial year 1983. The nominal 
exchange rate dropped from Rs. 10 to a US Dollar to over 50 in late 1990s.  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using State Bank of Pakistan (2012). 
 
Figure 2.  Region-Wise Receipts 
 
 
 
Source: WB Online ‘World Development Indicators’ & IFS database. 
 
Figure 3.  Pakistan’s Real and Nominal Exchange Rates (year 2000=100) and 
Remittances as a Share of the GDP 
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The currency continued sliding till the beginning of the new century, when Pakistan 
switched to a free-float after two years of multiple and dirty-float exchange rates. This 
led to an immediate drop of 18.5% in the financial year 2001. 
The REER maintained its downward trend in early 2000s despite a jump in formal 
remittance inflows starting from the financial year 2001. This period witnessed higher 
inflation in the country compared to its major trade partners, and an even sharper 
nominal rise of other major currencies against the US Dollar than the Pakistani Rupee. 
However, by the middle of the decade, high financial inflows had begun to take their toll 
and the REER index was on the rise.2 
Pakistan’s central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) targets interest rates to 
pursue the twin goals of growth and price level adjustment. It sells and purchases 
treasury bills, and intervenes in the open market to inject or mop up money to balance 
the monetary system. In spite of this occasional intervention policy, money growth in the 
economy has remained somewhat high (consistently in the double digits during the 
previous decade),3 and inflation rate has remained above the comfort zone,4 putting the 
country’s export sector under increasing pressure. Pakistan competes with other 
developing countries in mostly agricultural and low-cost industrial products. Major 
items include cotton, textiles and apparels, rice, leather goods, fish, surgical instruments, 
sporting goods, light machinery, cement, and petroleum products. Margins for these 
products are often low in the international market, and even small fall in price 
competitiveness can cost the exporters their market share. Figure 4 gives a 
nonparametric estimation of the relationship between remittances to Pakistan and its 
exports and imports. Prima facie, there is a negative relationship between exports and 
remittances (elasticity between remittances and exports as a share of GDP is, ceteris 
paribus, -0.20 as against +0.16 for imports).  
This preliminary evidence of the Dutch disease needs to be substantiated. For this, 
we proceed and study the drivers of real exchange rate (REER) in Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Pakistan’s real exchange index was at the same level in June 2009 as in Jan 2001. 
3 The growth in the country’s mass of money in circulation remained in double digits in all years of the 
last decade (except for the year 2008). 
4 For instance, the inflation rate rose by 24.3 percent in the financial year 2008-09. In cumulative terms, 
the economy experienced an inflation of 66 per cent between June 2007 and Oct 2010 (SBP 2010). 
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Figure 4.  Relationship between Remittances, Imports, and Exports  
(millions of USD/ Kernel Density Estimation) 
 
 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1.  Econometric Strategy 
 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) is considered a major determinant of a 
country’s external competitiveness. It is the relative price of domestic to foreign goods. 
An appreciation of the REER reduces the profitability of the export oriented sectors of 
the economy by raising their relative cost and by making the non-tradables relatively 
cheaper. Following Edwards (1988, 1989), and Montiel (1999), the Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER) can be considered as a measure of relative prices of the 
tradables and non-tradables, determined by various macroeconomic fundamentals 
driving the internal or external equilibrium. These fundamentals (also called 
determinants or drivers) explain, at least partly, the medium to long-term behaviour of 
the real exchange rate (Engel et al., 2007).5 A country’s real exchange rate can be 
estimated using various measures and macroeconomic models, and the choice of the 
appropriate measure depends on the question under study (Driver and Westaway, 2004). 
In this study, we are mainly concerned with whether or not foreign remittances have 
affected the country’s competitiveness. For this, we employ Real Effective Exchange 
Rate (REER) and examine its interaction with migrant remittances using annual as well 
as monthly data.    
 
5 For a review of literature on the REER determinants, see for instance, Edwards (1989), Edwards and 
Savastano (2000), Froot and Rogoff (1995), Hinkle and Montiel (1999) and Rogoff (1996). 
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First, we analyse the impact of our selected annual variables on Pakistan’s real 
effective exchange rate. Following the literature on drivers of REER, our model can be 
written as: 
 
.10
9876
543210
tt
tttt
tttttt
εDisasterθ
regimerateExchangeθODAθREMITθFDIθ
GDPpcθGOVθgrowthMoneyθOPENθTOTθθREER



    (1) 
 
Here, FDI represents the foreign direct investments, ODA represents the official 
development assistance (the two taken as a share of GDP), TOT represents the terms of 
trade, OPEN stands for trade openness as a share of GDP, GOV represents the public 
expenditure to GDP, and PROD is the proxy for productivity. Besides, POP indicates the 
demographic change, M2 growth the growth in money supply, 2000 the dummy variable 
for exchange regime change, and disaster the dummy indicator for natural disaster 
hitting the country. θ  is the parameter to be estimated and ε  stands for the errors. All 
the variables except for the growth of money supply and the dummy variables are taken 
in their log form (The variables and the reasons for their inclusion are explained below. 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Annual and Monthly Models 
Yearly variable Label Min. Mean SD Max. 
REER Real effective exchange rate index 
(2005=100) 
96.91 134.27 40.382 228.16 
Rem Workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees,  
received (% of GDP) 
1.454 4.747 2.430 10.248 
Open  Trade (% of GDP) 25.59 31.13 3.348 38.23 
TOT Net barter terms of trade index  
(2000=100) 
57.63 107.71 21.689 150.00 
GOV Expense (% of GDP) 7.781 11.347 2.382 16.805 
GDPpcw GDP per capita weighted  11399 15686 1466.366 18851 
GDPpcp  GDP per capita (current US$) 372.4 523.4 91.965 702.8 
Pop Age dependency ratio  
(% of working-age population) 
70.26 84.87 7.101 93.17 
ODA Net ODA received (% of GDP) 0.939 2.242 0.957 4.984 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows
(% of GDP) 
0.102 0.984 0.975 3.904 
IV  Instrumental variable for remittances 1345 2057 5344.937 31128 
ME Remittances from Middle East  
(current US$) 
0.920 2.977 2.177 7.950 
FARID MAKHLOUF AND MAZHAR MUGHAL 76
Europe Remittances from Europe 
(current US$) 
0.12 0.46 0.246 0.93 
America Remittances from North America 
(current US$) 
0.110 0.547 0.397 1.500 
Money growth Money growth rate 4.314 14.967 5.832 29.301 
TNT Tradable to Non-Tradable Ratio     
Monthly variable  Min. Mean SD Max. 
REER Real effective exchange rate index 
(2005 = 100) 
93.02 100.00 3.021 104.10 
Rem Workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees, received 
(current US$) 
84.74 371.60 109.390 602.20 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows(current US$) 
18.30 212.20 237.566 1263.0 
Money Market 
Rate 
Call Money  Rate  0.740 6.336 3.051 11.29 
Export Imports (current US$) 39560 71550 19783.358 1316 
Import Exports (current US$) 42880 111100 54946.968 2624 
Money Growth 
Rate  
Money Growth rate -0.063 0.016 0.043 0.334 
ME Remittances from the Middle East 
(current US$) 
44.2 182.5 73.117 333.9 
Europe Remittances from Europe(current 
US$) 
5.31 31.31 15.125 66.46 
America Remittances from North America 
(current US$) 
7.73 91.11 40.880 152.30 
 
 
Along with the impact of aggregate remittance flows, we include three region-wise 
remittance variables to study the corresponding impact of remittances coming from the 
three principal remitting geographical zones.6 The three regions are the Persian Gulf 
(comprising six Gulf Cooperation Council states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), North America (consisting of Canada and 
the U.S) and Europe (mainly the United Kingdom). The three regions together account 
for 90 percent of Pakistani migrants around the World and a similar proportion of 
remittances. 
Remittances may also affect the REER in the short-run. To account for this 
possibility, we study the behaviour of the REER in the last decade using monthly data. 
 
6 The regional regressions are not instrumented as the R packages used for these estimations do not allow 
multiple variable instruments. 
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We take imports, exports, remittances, FDI, and money growth rate as potential drivers 
for this analysis. Monthly data for GDP are not available, hence we are unable to 
determine the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Similarly, terms of trade, demographic 
evolution and official development assistance are not included due to data inavailability. 
As discussed above, these fundamentals explain a big part of REER movement, and in 
their absence, the monthly estimations can only be considered suggestive. This analysis 
can show the robustness of the impacts of remittances on the annual REER. 
Alternatively, it can hint at the way in which the impact has deviated in the recent years 
from the over all trend. As a robustness check, we carry out our analysis using 
WPI-based REER and find the results with identical signs and magnitudes.7 
Once the existence of Dutch disease has been inferred through REER appreciation 
mechanism, we go further and estimate the remittances’ association with the tradables to 
non-tradables ratio (TNT) in the country. The course of this ratio, calculated as the sum 
of agricultural and industrial value-added weighted by the services sector value-added 
(Lartey et al., 2008), approximates the magnitude and direction of resource reallocation 
through the sectoral movement of resources. We also construct alternative series of 
tradables and non-tradables using disaggregated sector-wise data, in which the tradable 
sector consists of agricultural and industrial goods and services that the country has 
traded in the last three decades. 
 
3.2.  Choice of Variables 
 
We take Consumer Price Index (CPI)-based Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
index as our indicator of choice, defined as the nominal effective exchange rate index 
adjusted for relative changes in consumer prices. The REER for the Pakistani Rupee is 
calculated as a geometric-weighted mean of the level of consumer prices in Pakistan 
relative to its major trade partners. The REER can also be calculated using Wholesale 
Price Index (WPI) or Producer Price Index (PPI). Unlike CPI-based REER, these two 
give a higher weightage to the tradables than the domestic non-tradables. Given that the 
non-tradables constitute half of Pakistan’s output, the use of CPI-based REER should be 
more suitable for this analysis. 
Remittances are taken as a share of GDP. As discussed above, foreign remittances 
may cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. They can however equally respond to 
changes in the country’s exchange rate. This is because migrants may vary their 
remitting behaviour, keeping in mind the welfare of the recipients and their investment 
plans. In other words, migrants’ behaviour, whether altruist, self-interested or 
compensatory, plays a role in the determination of a country’s exchange rate. Money 
remitted for investment motives, for instance, would likely be procyclical and may 
therefore push the real exchange rate further up; the reverse may happen in the case of 
 
7 We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.  
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altruistic remittances. This means that remittances may be endogenous to the REER in 
our model and thus need to be instrumented. 
Several instruments for remittances have been proposed in the literature, such as the 
stock or flow of migrants, distance from the remittance sending country, remittances to 
the rest of the world, population, recipient country’s latitude, school enrolment, 
population density etc. Nevertheless, data availability precludes some of them, while 
others are not found appropriate in our case. Stock or flow of migrants can be an 
excellent instrument, but complete and reliable data on the variable are not available. 
Remittances to Pakistan are found to be strongly correlated both to home as well as host 
countries’ economic situation (Goujon and Mughal, 2013). Therefore, remittances to 
Pakistan may not be strongly associated with remittances to the rest of the world. 
Likewise, latitude does not appear to be a pertinent instrument for remittances to 
Pakistan. The choice of latitude is based on the argument that most host countries are in 
the north, while the migrant-sending countries are located in southern latitudes. In case of 
Pakistan however, a big chunk of remittances comes from the Persian Gulf states which 
are further to the south of Pakistan. Likewise, the reasoning behind the choice of distance 
as instrument for remittances is that greater distances between the migrant-sending and 
receiving countries are inversely proportional to migration, and ultimately the amount 
remitted by the migrants. Although millions of Pakistani migrants live in the nearby Gulf 
states and their remittances make up a major part of the total, yet two of the four major 
sources of Pakistani remittances are the distant United States and United Kingdom. 
We take the per capita output of Pakistan’s top ten remittance-sending countries8 
weighted by their respective shares in the country’s remittances, as our instrument for 
remittances. As shown in Goujon and Mughal (2013), remittances to Pakistan from 
various destinations are strongly influenced by the economic situation of the host 
countries. Nevertheless, host economy output, weighted by the country’s share in 
Pakistan’s total formal remittance flows, need not be linked to Pakistan’s REER. 
Besides being intuitive, the instrument passes the required econometric tests of 
overidentification and weak instruments. It is highly correlated with Pakistan’s 
remittance flows (correlation coefficient being 0.81) and is exogenous to the REER 
(correlation coefficient being 0.06). Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and foreign aid 
(ODA) as shares of the GDP are the other indicators of the country’s private and public 
financial receipts. We do not include portfolio investment in our model, as portfolio 
inflows have stayed relatively insignificant for most of the period under study.9  
Following Lartey (2007, 2008), Prati and Thiessy (2006), and Rajan and 
Subramanian (2010), we expect Dutch disease effects for development aid inflows. 
 
8 In Pakistan’s case, the ten top remitting countries during the last three decades have been: Saudi Arabia, 
USA, UAE, UK, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Germany and Canada. 
9 In the studied period, portfolio investments never went above 0.02 percent of the GDP in contrast to 
remittances, foreign assistance and FDI which crossed 10, 7 and 4 percent of the GDP respectively. 
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Foreign assistance to a developing country is often directed at the improvement of 
institutional and human capital as well as various infrastructure projects. Much of the 
resulting increase in demand falls on the non tradables, leading to higher prices and an 
appreciated real exchange rate. Nonetheless, these investments may foster higher 
productivity (especially that of the non-tradable sector relative to the tradable sector) and 
increased competitiveness in the long run, which may alleviate or even reverse the 
previously induced Dutch disease effects (Issa and Ouattara, 2008). The competitiveness 
enhancing impact of FDI crucially depends on the nature of foreign investments. 
Investments made in export and import-competing sectors lead to improved physical and 
human capital, technology and technical knowledge spillovers and higher productivity, 
which should ultimately lead to a more competitive economy. On the other hand, if 
foreign investors gain access to domestic assets through hasty privatization, and the 
investment amounts to little more than change of asset ownership, the investors may not 
care to substantially invest in the acquired assets’ future, and the investments may not 
result in higher productivity (Mughal and Vechiu, 2010). FDI may well cause the REER 
to appreciate in such a case.  
In Pakistan, much of the FDI coming during the recent years have gone in the 
services sector, with finance, information and telecommunications attracting the bulk of 
foreign investments (SBP, 2012). The country has also privatized much of the 
previously state owned banks and industrial corporations. The cumulative impact of 
these investments on the REER may well be positive.  
Among the REER fundamentals, country’s per capita or per worker output (taken as 
an indicator of productivity) control for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The Balassa- 
Samuelson effect could develop both due to the productivity differential between the 
country’s tradable and non-tradable sectors, as well as due to the productivity 
differential between the country and its trade partners. To examine the latter aspect, we 
take the ratio between Pakistan’s and its ten principal trade partners’ GDP per capita, 
each weighted by the country’s corresponding share in Pakistan’s trade, as an alternative 
indicator of productivity besides the standard GDP per capita variable.10 Following the 
Balassa Samuelson hypothesis, we expect a positive sign for the productivity variables. 
As a developing country catches up with developed economies, its tradable sector 
productivity increases faster relative to the non-tradable sector. This leads to higher 
income and increased demand for the non-tradables, thus causing structural inflation. As 
a result, the REER moves up. 
The sign of trade openness, taken as the sum of exports and imports of the country as 
a share of its output,11 is mostly found in the literature to be negative (see for instance, 
 
10 Pakistan’s ten major trade partner during the studied period, in descending order, are the United States, 
Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, China, France, Italy, South Korea, and Malaysia. 
11 The Sachs-Warner trade restriction index could serve as a better proxy, but the data for this variable are 
incomplete and hence, can not be considered in our study. 
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Candelon et al., 2007; Edwards, 1989; Lee et al., 2008; Saborowski, 2009). It is mainly 
because opening up to international trade through lower tariff and non-tariff barriers 
leads to more efficient tradable sector, bringing down the relative prices of the tradables 
and increasing their consumption. 
On the other hand, the impact of terms of trade can not be judged a priori, and 
depends on whether the income or the substitution effect dominates (the REER rises in 
the former scenario and wanes in the latter). Improved terms of trade means higher 
domestic income, which leads to increased spending. Spending on tradables does not 
cause a change in their prices (small economy hypothesis), but higher demand of 
non-tradables causes their prices to increase, leading to appreciation in the REER. On 
the other hand, cheaper imports relative to domestic non-tradables lead to higher 
consumption of imported goods at the cost of the non-tradables. The resulting drop in 
the price of non-tradables causes the REER to fall.  
The net effect of government consumption is likewise ambiguous. Government 
expenditure in developing countries is predominantly spent on non-tradables (principally 
on public sector salaries), contributing to real exchange rate appreciation. On the other 
hand, if public spending involves a high share of imported goods, the country’s trade 
balance is adversely affected, necessitating depreciation in exchange rate. However, if 
public money is well spent on infrastructure, development and maintenance of public 
institutions and human capital improvement, the country’s productive sectors strengthen 
and the short-term appreciation in the REER dampens in the long run. The impact of 
public spending on the REER can be better studied using government spending on the 
non-tradables. This variable is however inavailable, and in its place, total government 
spending as a share of the GDP is deemed a suitable alternative (Edwards, 1989; Chishti 
and Hassan, 1993).  
We take age dependency ratio as the primary indicator for demographic change. It is 
defined as the ratio of dependents (persons under 15 or over 65) to the working-age 
population. Alternatively, we use population growth rate. Both indicators put upward 
pressure on a developing country’s real exchange rate, as the ensuing increase in 
demand raises the country’s imports and causes a deterioration in the trade balance. A 
positive sign can therefore be expected for both of the indicators.  
There is some evidence that monetary policy influences a country’s real exchange 
rate, at least in the short term (Rodrik, 2008). For example, money growth, being a 
nominal variable, is usually not considered among the determinants of the REER. 
However, several studies, including Lartey et al. (2008) and Lommatzsch and Tober 
(2004) count it among REER’s important drivers. Excess money growth puts upward 
pressure on prices of non-tradable goods, and is associated with inflationary tendencies 
and appreciation of the real exchange rate (Lartey et al., 2008). 
Similarly, change of exchange rate regime, if not taken into account, can lead to 
spurious empirical results (Ball et al., 2010; Caceres and Saca, 2006; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2005). A fixed exchange rate regime is less able to neutralize the spending 
effects on the non-tradables, causing resource reallocation, ultimately leading to a higher 
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REER (Lartey et al., 2008). As mentioned above, Pakistan followed a managed float till 
1998, and after a brief transition period, officially free-floated the Rupee in 2000. We 
take a dummy variable to account for this de jure change in exchange regime, taking the 
value of one for the post-2000 period.  
Recent literature has proposed natural disasters as another potentially important 
determinant of the REER in the developing countries (see for instance Barajas et al., 
2010; Christiansen et al., 2009). A natural disaster can wipe out a developing country’s 
productive capital, causing lower productivity. If the resulting income shock improves 
the country’s trade balance, this can lead to a REER depreciation. On the contrary, if the 
country relies on foreign capital (such as foreign aid) to rebuild the damaged 
infrastructure or to smooth consumption, the country’s REER may appreciate. Since 
Pakistan has occasionally suffered severe natural catastrophes, we find it appropriate to 
include the incidence of natural disasters as a driver of the country’s real exchange rate. 
The disaster variable is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for a loss of 1000 
or more lives, loss of $1 billion or 1 million casualties in any given year.12 In our 
studied period, six years (1992, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2005 and 2007) meet the above 
criteria, either due to severe flooding or the 7.6 magnitude earthquake in 2005. 
We consider the period from 1980 to 2008 in the annual, and from July 2001 to 
March 2009 for the monthly analysis. Therefore, we work with 29 yearly and 93 
monthly observations. Data for remittances and FDI have been provided by the State 
Bank of Pakistan, the dependency ratio is taken from the World Bank WDI database, 
data for our the disaster dummy come from Université Catholique de Louvain’s 
EM-DAT Disaster Database, whereas the remaining variables come from the IFS online 
database. 
Before describing the results, we first briefly mention the technique used in the 
study. 
 
3.3.  The Bayesian Paradigm 
 
We use the Bayesian Instrumental Variable method to control for endogeneity. We 
estimate the parameters of the above equation, so our model can be written as 
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12 We take this arbitrary definition keeping in view the area, population and economic size of the country. 
Relaxing the definition of number of dead to 500 adds another year. Considering monetary losses of at least 
$100 million adds yet another two observations. 
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where X is the matrix of explanatory variables defined above. PIBH is the instrument for 
remittances.  
The Bayesian analysis provides the benefits of exact sample results, integration of 
decision-making, ‘estimation’, ‘testing’, and model selection, and a full accounting of 
uncertainty (Rossi et al., 2005). It is a rational framework which models all the inputs, 
implying that the parameters are considered as variables. By taking the unobservable 
information into account in this way can improve the quality of the estimations and 
forecasts (Parent and Bernier, 2007). The Bayesian approach draws heavily on the 
probability theory and takes account of prior information to generate the distribution of 
observables conditional on the data and the prior.   
The Bayesian approach requires the specification of prior distribution. The prior can 
be specified as follows: 
 
).,(~),,(~),(),,(~ 11 VηIWσandAmNγβAmNδ βγβγδδ   
 
Prior values are given in parentheses. 
 
δm : prior mean (0), 
δA : pds (positive definite symmetric) prior precision (0 .01),  
βγm : prior mean vector for prior on )0(, γβ , 
βγA : pds prior prec for prior on )01.0(, γβ , 
η : d.f. parm for IW prior on )5(σ , 
V : pds location matrix for IW prior on Sigma(0). 
 
There are several types of priors. We use the non informative prior (also called flat 
prior), giving the mean a value 0. A prior distribution is considered noninformative if its 
impact on the posterior distribution of θ  is minimal. 
Results of Bayesian analysis are shown in the form of moments of marginal 
distributions of the parameters (such as the posterior mean and posterior standard 
deviation). These are the OLS analogues of parameter coefficients and standard errors. 
To calculate the posterior mean, we apply the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
method using the Gibbs algorithm.13 
 
 
 
 
 
13 The annual and monthly estimations are made using the R Bayesm and MCMCpack packages 
respectively, the latter solves the linear model whereas the former finds the posterior marginal distribution. 
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4.  REMITTANCES AND DUTCH DISEASE: SPENDING EFFECT 
 
4.1.  Annual REER Model 
 
The findings given in Table 2 show that remittances parameter has a positive 
marginal posterior mean, the posterior mean being +0.29. In other words, a doubling of 
migrant remittances (as a share of GDP) leads to a real exchange rate appreciation of 
29%. A look at the quantiles (three out of five quantiles showing a positive sign) 
confirms the positive (though moderate) nature of the remittances posteriors. Moreover, 
if the baseline equation is repeated without the remittance instrument, the marginal mean 
drops to 0.27 which signifies that the the impact of remittances is underestimated if 
endogeneity is not taken into consideration. 
 
 
Table 2.  Annual REER Determinants 
 Mean SD 
Intercept -0.660 8.291 
Rem  0.29 0.27 
Open  -0.272 0.825 
TOT  -0.226 0.615 
GOV -0.339 0.451 
GDPpcw  -0.461 0.741 
Pop  2.814 2.104 
ODA -0.051 0.158 
FDI 0.014 0.153 
Money Growth -0.004 0.009 
Exchange Rate Regime  -0.068 0.378 
Disaster  0.0362 0.155 
Quantiles 2.5% 5% 50% 95% 97.5% 
Intercept -17.340 -14.655 -0.6186 13.077 15.667 
Rem  -0.23 -0.12 0.28 0.74 0.87 
Open  -1.885 -1.594 -0.2838 1.073 1.327 
TOT  -1.449 -1.241 -0.2286 0.769 0.927 
GOV -1.207 -1.055 -0.3604 0.424 0.587 
GDPpcw  -1.942 -1.683 -0.4667 0.763 0.965 
Pop  -1.460 -0.585 2.7903 6.190 6.901 
ODA -0.373 -0.321 -0.0476 0.203 0.266 
FDI -0.293 -0.231 0.0142 0.266 0.319 
Money Growth -0.022 -0.020 -0.0042 0.012 0.014 
Exchange Rate Regim  -0.816 -0.705 -0.0692 0.542 0.653 
Disaster  -0.285 -0.225 0.0403 0.281 0.323 
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FDI and ODA show a positive and negative sign respectively, both showing a 
relatively weak mean value. Their impact seems marginal as compared to that of foreign 
remittances. Dependency ratio and disaster dummy exhibit positive signs, while the 
remaining variables show negative signs. Age dependency ratio has by far the strongest 
impact of all the variables in the model. The same model was estimated using GDP per 
capita as the productivity indicator, and did not alter our results (results not shown). 
 
 
Table 3.  Annual Region-Wise REER Determinants 
 Mean SD 
Intercept -0.595 3.943 
Open  -0.053 0.288 
TOT  -0.268 0.160 
GOV -0.356 0.127 
GDPpcw  -0.078 0.220 
Pop  1.836 0.913 
ODA 0.002 0.046 
FDI 0.062 0.043 
ME 0.350 0.089 
Europe -0.004 0.105 
America -0.109 0.048 
Disaster 0.0001 0.040 
Exchange Rate Regime  -0.047 0.125 
Quantiles 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5% 
Intercept -8.341 -3.126 -0.661 1.936 7.254 
Open  -0.620 -0.241 -0.052 0.128 0.531 
TOT  -0.586 -0.370 -0.268 -0.164 0.048 
GOV -0.610 -0.439 -0.356 -0.275 -0.103 
GDPpcw  -0.518 -0.218 -0.804 0.065 0.3610 
Pop  0.0259 1.2441 1.848 2.429 3.5952 
ODA -0.091 -0.027 2.686 0.032 0.0925 
FDI -0.024 0.035  6.276 0.090 0.1510 
ME 0.1705 0.293 3.502 0.408 0.5293 
Europe -0.212 -0.073 -4.481 0.061 0.2062 
America -0.206 -0.140 -1.097 -0.078 -0.014 
Disaster -0.079 -0.025 6.262 0.0261 0.0798 
Exchange Rate Regim  -0.301 -0.127 -4.824 0.0344 0.1979 
 
 
In terms of region-wise impacts (Table 3), remittances from the Persian Gulf show a 
strong positive impact. A 1% growth in remittances from the Gulf as a share of GDP is 
associated with 0.35% appreciation of the REER. Remittances from North America and 
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Europe, however, do not appear to be associated with REER appreciation. Remittances 
from Europe have a negligible impact, while those from North America show a small 
negative relationship. Both the Gulf and North American remittances have robust signs 
maintained through out the distribution. 
 
4.2.  Monthly REER Model 
 
The REER lifting effect of remittances is confirmed using the monthly data (Table 4). 
Remittances and FDI respectively show positive and negative marginal mean values. 
Exports and imports have intuitive negative and positive marginal means. The 
region-wise impacts of remittances (Table 5) are similar for Europe. The relationship 
between remittances from Europe and Pakistan’s real exchange rate is marginal, and not 
REER-appreciating. This may owe to the stable nature of these inflows (Mughal and 
Makhlouf, 2011).  
 
 
Table 4.  Monthly REER Determinants 
 Mean SD 
Intercept 4.759 0.165 
Rem 0.0217 0.011 
FDI 0.0057 0.004 
Exports -0.086 0.028 
Imports 0.0574 0.018 
Money Growth -0.170 0.058 
Quantiles 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5% 
Intercept 4.437 4.647 4.7603 4.870 5.084 
Rem -0.0003 0.014 0.0218 0.029 0.043 
FDI -0.003 0.002 0.0057 0.008 0.014 
Exports -0.141 -0.105 -0.087 -0.068 -0.03 
Imports 0.0214 0.0451 0.0575 0.0697 0.094 
Money Growth -0.285 -0.209 -0.170 -0.131 -0.054 
 
 
Table 5.  Monthly Region-Wise REER Determinants 
 Mean SD 
Intercept 4.662 0.184 
Asia -0.038 0.012 
Europe -0.001 0.015 
America 0.0106 0.0076 
FDI 0.0096 0.00418 
Exports -0.069 0.0277 
Imports 0.0725 0.0193 
Money Growth -0.136 0.0564 
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Quantiles 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5% 
Intercept 4.308 4.537 4.660 4.782 5.026 
Asia -0.064 -0.047 -0.038 -0.03 -0.013 
Europe -0.031 -0.011 -0.001 0.008 0.0287 
America -0.0043 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.0257 
FDI 0.0015 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.0178 
Exports -0.124 -0.088 -0.069 -0.051 -0.016 
Imports 0.0341 0.059 0.072 0.085 0.1102 
Money Growth -0.248 -0.174 -0.136 -0.098 -0.027 
 
 
However, remittances from the Persian Gulf appear to negatively interact with the 
REER. This apparently contradicts the Dutch disease effects found with the annual 
series. This may be partly due to the different time periods for the two data sets. The 
annual data set covers all the three major episodes of Pakistan’s formal remittance 
experience: sharp rise in early 1980s, followed by stagnation and decline in the late 
1980s and 1990s, and revival in the 2000s. The monthly data set, on the other hand, 
begins just before the 9/11 attacks and shortly after the de jure free float of Pakistani 
Rupee. This data set, therefore, does not include the greater part of the country’s 
remittance experience prior to these two important changes in the early 2000s. This 
difference can be crucial, as the relationship between remittances from the GCC 
countries and the REER is similar if same time period is studied using the two data sets. 
The bivariate correlation between the two variables turns from +0.89 in the pre -2000 
annual subset to -0.45 afterwards. This latter is similar to -0.4 correlation found for the 
monthly sample. These results may thus hint a change in the behaviour of remittances 
from the GCC during the last decade.  
If indeed remittances from the Middle East have had no Dutch disease-causing effect 
during the 2000s, this should portent well for the economy, given the ongoing 
substantial flows of remittances from the Gulf states.  
Here, a caveat needs to be mentioned: Even though the REER appreciating effects of 
remittances found in this study are unambiguous and stronger than those found in earlier 
studies on Pakistani remittances, the effects found over all are relatively mild (the effects 
are just a fraction of those exerted by demographic factors, for instance). This may owe 
to the strong relationship with domestic savings that remittances to Pakistan exhibit 
(Anwar and Mughal, 2012). Part of the savings that remittances generate goes to the 
tradable sector, thus limiting the loss to the sector through other channels. Similarly, 
some of remittances consumed are spent on imported goods, pushing down the real 
exchange rate (the positive correlation between remittances and imports (Figure 4) is a 
case in point). 
Official development assistance, on the contrary, does not appear to have a 
damaging impact on the country’s exchange rate. This could be due to the fact that these 
inflows, being official transfers, are not spent in the same way as remittances. Our 
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results provide evidence to the argument that despite wastage of development funds due 
to bureaucratic red-tape, corruption, and lack of spending capacity, ODA has improved 
the country’s real exchange rate. This is hardly surprising given the fact that foreign 
assistance is often directed at infrastructure development and provision of public service 
projects with high social and economic returns in developing countries, adding to the 
economy’s productive capacity. Aid also puts upward pressure on a country’s imports, 
and keeps the real exchange from rising in the long run.14 Our results corroborate the 
findings of Issa and Outtara (2008) in the context of the Syrian economy. 
FDI shows mixed signs of Dutch disease inducing effects (the correlation with the 
REER is positive in the annual and negative in the monthly model). This divergence 
may be due to the remarkably high levels of foreign investment in the 2000s that reflect 
disproportionately in the monthly results. FDI remained under $1 billion till 2003, but 
rose sharply then onwards to cross $5.4 billion in 2008. 
The effect of FDI on the REER, however, appears to be much weaker than those of 
the remittances. This can be gauged from the sectoral distribution of these inflows. 
Foreign investments in Pakistan have involved both services and industrial sectors. FDI 
to Pakistan has been either in the form of acquisitions of private local concerns (e.g. 
banks, food and beverage companies) and nationalized corporations, or domestic- 
consumption-related investments. Oil and gas exploration, fossil-fuel based power plants, 
communications and financial services together comprised 72 percent of foreign 
investments in Pakistan during the period from 2001 to 2009 (SBP, 2012).  
Among other determinants of REER, terms of trade and trade openness both show a 
negative correlation with the real exchange rate. In the case of trade openness, the result 
is expected, and corroborates the evidence generally found in the literature. The negative 
sign for terms of trade implies that rapid deterioration of terms of trade in the recent 
years has pushed the real exchange rate upwards.15 The strong relationship between 
REER and age dependency ratio highlights the important role demographic change is 
playing in the developing countries. The negligible mean value of money supply growth 
indicates that this nominal variable plays no role in the long run. The exchange regime 
dummy shows a negative sign, meaning that Pakistan’s adoption of flexible exchange 
rate regime has made the country’s exchange rate more competitive. The disaster 
dummy shows a small positive impact, which may point to the fact natural disasters in 
Pakistan have generally followed a surge in migrant remittances and official 
development assistance.   
Another notable finding is the lack of support for the Balassa Samuelson hypothesis. 
This apparently counterintuitive result has been discussed in previous studies such as 
 
14 See for instance, Tressel et al. (2009) and Torvik (2001) for more on the latter argument. 
15 After remaining above 100 throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the country’s terms of trade sharply fell 
from 90 in 2001 to 55 in 2008. 
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Rogoff (1996). Dumrongrittikul (2011) also find evidence of real exchange rate 
depreciation among relatively rapidly growing developing countries. 
The results so far have confirmed spending effect symptoms of the Dutch disease. 
Moreover, we have some indications of the gradual erosion of competitiveness of 
Pakistan’s export sector (Figure 4). In the next section, we study the resource movement 
aspect of the Dutch disease. 
 
 
5.  REMITTANCES AND DUTCH DISEASE: RESOURCE REALLOCATION 
EFFECT 
 
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of remittances on the reallocation of 
resources between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. This helps distinguish the 
resource movement effect of remittances from their spending effect (Lartey et al., 2008). 
The rising spending power of remittances-receiving households that increases the 
relative demand for services raises the price level of the non-tradable sector. This leads 
labour and capital movement towards the non-tradable sector at the cost of tradable 
goods sector, resulting in the loss of export competitiveness. A clear negative 
relationship will therefore confirm our hypothesis that in Pakistan, remittances have 
added to the loss of competitiveness of its major exports through resource movement 
towards the production of non-tradable goods and services. 
 
 
Table 6.  Remittances and Tradable to Non-Tradable (TNT) Ratio 
 Mean SD 
Intercept 5.849 2.890 
Open  0.175 0.108 
TOT  -0.080 0.073 
GOV -0.039 0.070 
GDPpcw  -0.616 0.209 
Pop  -0.456 0.453 
ODA 0.009 0.023 
FDI -0.009 0.021 
Rem -0.059 0.029 
Exchange Rate  -0.098 0.057 
Disaster 0.016 0.020 
Quantiles 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5% 
Intercept 0.255 3.941 5.825 7.717 11.560 
Open  -0.042 0.106 0.175 0.245 0.391 
TOT  -0.231 -0.127 -0.077 -0.03 0.066 
GOV -0.177 -0.085 -0.040 0.005 0.100 
GDPpcw  -1.041 -0.752 -0.615 -0.480 -0.209 
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Pop  -1.343 -0.752 -0.456 -0.155 0.441 
ODA -0.035 -0.004 0.0098 0.025 0.055 
FDI -0.053 -0.023 -0.009 0.004 0.033 
Rem -0.117 -0.078 -0.059 -0.040 -0.001 
Exchange Rate  -0.214 -0.135 -0.097 -0.059 0.015 
Disaster -0.024 0.002 0.0161 0.029 0.057 
 
 
Table 6 shows the findings of estimation using the tradable to non-tradable (TNT) 
ratio as the explained variable. As expected, remittances have a negative average impact 
on the sectoral output decomposition. However, its impact (marginal posterior mean= 
-0.06), is much smaller than those of trade openness, productivity, or the demographic 
change.16 This behaviour of remittances (strong REER appreciation coupled with a 
weak relative tradable to non-tradable output) corroborates the findings of Sosa and 
Magud (2010).  
We further probe this question by reconstructing our tradable to non-tradable ratio 
by redefining the tradable and non-tradable sectors using disaggregated data. 
Agricultural and industrial goods and services which Pakistan has generally not traded in 
the last three decades are excluded from the list of tradables. We treat industrial 
subsectors of slaughtering, construction and electricity and gas distribution, and the 
agricultural subsector of forestry as non-tradables. The series slightly differs from the 
original one, with a partial correlation of 0.95. Results using this reconstructed series 
confirm the weak nature of correlation between remittances and sectoral resource 
movement (results available upon request). A 100% increase in remittances causes less 
than 1% change in the tradable to non-tradable ratio.  
Pakistan’s economic structure has evolved in the last three decades, with an 
increasingly important role of services at the cost of the share of the agricultural sector.17 
Remittances also seem to be among the contributors to this trend. Remittances are 
positively correlated with the country’s services sector during the studied period, 
whereas the tradable sector, comprising industry and agriculture, is negatively associated 
(Figure 5). Rise in remittance inflows has pushed up the weight of non-tradable sector in 
the economy at the cost of industry and agriculture. However, it must be noted that 
agriculture shows the expected negative relationship, whereas the association with 
industry comes out to be positive. A possible reason for this can be that industry has 
over the years benefited from the increase in demand for manufactured goods as a result 
of remittance receiving households’ rising purchasing power. Moreover, remittances 
 
16 Lartey et al. (2008), in contrast, find a sizeable 1 percent drop in the tradable to non-tradable ratio for a 
1 percent remittances to GDP increase. 
17 The share of services in the national production rose from 45 percent in 1980 to 54 percent in 2009, 
whereas that of agriculture dropped by a equal 9 percent to 20 percent from the previous 29 percent. 
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have sometimes financed small and medium industrial startups, whereas remittance 
receiving households are often known to neglect or abandon agriculture. This last result 
nevertheless requires further investigation and is left for future research.  
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WB Online ‘World Development Indicators’. 
 
Figure 5.  Relationship between Remittances and Sectoral Output Shares  
(Kernel Density Estimation) 
 
 
FDI, on the other hand, shows a small but helpful influence on the non-tradables’ 
sector. The weak impact of FDI on the TNT ratio points to the diverse nature of foreign 
investments made in the country, ranging from bank acquisitions to fertilizers and 
pharmaceuticals. FDI, therefore, clearly exhibits neither the spending nor the resource 
movement effects of the Dutch disease. However, lack of real exchange rate 
depreciation effect suggests that the flows of FDI that accelerated in the 2000s have 
apparently not improve the country’s competitiveness, and the purported benefits of 
FDIs have not materialized.  
Among other findings, the productivity indicator shows a negative relationship with 
the structural shift ratio. Gradual strengthening of the services sector, mostly at the cost 
of the agricultural sector, is a common sight in the developing economies. The negative 
sign of government spending also underscores this point. In Pakistan, much of the 
federal budget has historically gone on debt servicing, defence, pays and perks of 
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government employees, and provision of education and health services. This confirms 
the expenditure bias towards non-tradable goods shown in the literature (see for instance, 
Bergstrand, 1991).  
The positive sign for trade openness is intuitive, and supports the broad agreement in 
the literature on the productivity-enhancing impacts of trade liberalization. In terms of 
region-wise impact (Table 7), remittances from the Persian Gulf and North America 
both show negative signs. This confirms the anecdotal evidence of remittances financing 
the real estate boom in the country (Oda, 2009). 
 
 
Table 7.  Region-Wise Remittances and Tradable to Non-Tradable Ratio 
 Mean SD 
Intercept 7.424 2.989 
Open  -0.037 0.123 
TOT  -0.056 0.066 
GOV -0.065 0.074 
GDPpcw  -0.537 0.236 
Pop  -0.739 0.448 
ODA -0.013 0.021 
FDI -0.022 0.018 
ME -0.124 0.039 
Europe 0.1285 0.046 
America -0.035 0.020 
Exchange Rate  -0.125 0.050 
Disaster 0.0264 0.017 
Quantiles 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5% 
Intercept 1.552 5.506 7.411 9.345 13.376 
Open  -0.280 -0.119 -0.039 0.041 0.211 
TOT  -0.189 -0.099 -0.056 -0.013 0.075 
GOV -0.210 -0.114 -0.065 -0.0187 0.080 
GDPpcw  -1.021 -0.684 -0.536 -0.385 -0.062 
Pop  -1.629 -1.029 -0.733 -0.447 0.126 
ODA -0.057 -0.027 -0.013 0.00009 0.028 
FDI -0.059 -0.034 -0.022 -0.010 0.015 
ME -0.203 -0.149 -0.124 -0.098 -0.046 
Europe 0.0363 0.0983 0.128 0.158 0.222 
America -0.076 -0.048 -0.035 -0.223 0.006 
Exchange Rate  -0.226 -0.158 -0.125 -9.308 -0.025 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Remittance flows to Pakistan have, over the years, helped millions of Pakistanis 
come out of poverty (Mughal and Anwar, 2012) and improved health and educational 
attainment among the rural recipient households (Mansuri, 2007). The resulting better 
educated and healthier workforce can indeed improve the country’s long-run 
competitiveness. This beneficial impact of remittances through human capital 
accumulation may take time to realize, and in the meanwhile, negative impacts may 
dominate through the monetary channel. This study has shown that the Pakistani 
economy exhibits symptoms of Dutch disease as a result of migrant remittance inflows. 
The results lend credence to the argument that remittances have, over the years, caused a 
shift in resource allocation through consumption of non-tradable goods and services. 
This additional demand for non tradable goods and services has pushed up the price 
level and made local production relatively expensive. The net effect is that the country’s 
exports have become relatively less competitive in the foreign markets and the imports 
have become more attractive. The harmful effects of remittances on the country’s 
competitiveness are opposite to what we find for the FDI and particularly, for the official 
development assistance. The real exchange rate appreciating effect of remittances is 
more significant than the one caused by other financial flows because unlike foreign 
capital inflows, remittances are the outcome of a gradually developing social process 
(that of migration), and are not prone to sudden stops or reversals. Therefore, their 
REER affecting tendency can be dealt only partially through temporary monetary and 
fiscal measures. The loss in external competitiveness, in this case, needs to be 
remediated through improvements in internal competitiveness. More attention is 
required for channelling remittances towards productive avenues. In the absence of 
adequate investment opportunities, much of the remittances are spent on conspicuous 
consumption. By providing investment avenues to overseas Pakistanis and promoting 
small-scale enterprises, these remittances can be harnessed in a way that improves the 
country’s productivity. In terms of macroeconomic adjustment, the country needs to 
rethink its monetary policy in light of the increasing importance of remittance receipts. 
As demonstrated by Chami et al. (2006), a country’s optimal monetary policy for a 
remittance-dependent economy is different from the one for an economy with no 
significant remittances. The competitiveness-affecting impact of remittances can be 
further controlled through judicious use of fiscal policy. Improving labour productivity 
through skill enhancement programs and making the taxation regime leaner and more 
transparent can be steps towards this goal.  
In the end, it must be said that real exchange rate is only one of the factors defining a 
country’s competitiveness (the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, for instance, is 
based on over 140 indicators of competitiveness). Pakistan’s competitiveness score has 
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fallen in both in absolute and relative terms in the recent years.18 In the last few years, it 
has done poorly in comparison to similar and neighbouring economies, even relative to 
those who receive more remittances as a share of output than Pakistan. Policymakers, 
therefore, need to concentrate both on the external as well as internal competitiveness 
improvements to extenuate the effects of remittance-induced loss of competitiveness. 
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